

Message Text

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NODIS
CHEROKEE

FOLLOWING REPEAT MOSCOW 9615 ACTION SECSTATE DATED JUL 05:

QTE:S E C R E T MOSCOW 9615

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PARM, UR, US
SUBJECT: APPOINTMENT WITH BREZHNEV, JULY 5, 1977

REF: (A.) MOSCOW 9564, (B) MOSCOW 9580

SUMMARY: I WAS RECEIVED BY BREZHNEV TODAY FOR MEETING
WHICH LASTED ONE HOUR AND 40 MINUTES. BREZHNEV DELIVERED
PREPARED COMMENTARY ON PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JUNE 9 -
WHICH LARGELY REPEATED STANDARD SOVIET POSITIONS, BUT CONTAINED
NUMEROUS APPEALS FOR IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS - AND I MADE
COMMENTS ON US APPROACH TO SALT, POSSIBILITY OF A CARTER-
BREZHNEV MEETING, PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE IN U.S. TRADE
LEGISLATION, THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION AND THE PRESIDENT'S
POSITION REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS. REGARDING CARTER-BREZHNEV

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MEETING, BREZHNEV REPLIED THAT CAREFUL PREPARATION ESSENTIAL
AND IMPLIED THAT SALT AGREEMENT AND PERHAPS SOME OTHERS SHOULD
BE READY - OR ALMOST READY - FOR SIGNATURE BEFORE MEETING
WOULD BE DESIRABLE. BREZHNEV CONVEYED LETTER TO PRESIDENT
CARTER FOR TRANSMITTAL. END SUMMARY.

1. BREZHNEV RECEIVED ME AT 11:30 THIS MORNING FOR MEETING

WHICH LASTED UNTIL 1:10. HE OPENED MEETING BY OFFERING HIS CONGRATULATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE DAY AND NOTED THAT HE HAD SENT A TELEGRAM TO PRESIDENT CARTER FOR THE OCCASION. HE THEN NOTED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF JUNE 9 AND WAS PREPARED TO OFFER HIS OPINIONS ON THE QUESTIONS IT RAISED. BEFORE TURNING TO HIS PREPARED NOTES, HOWEVER, HE SAID WITH SOME EMOTION THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SAY ONE THING MAN-TO-MAN: IF OUR TWO LEADERS MEET AND ASK EACH OTHER "WHERE ARE YOU LEADING MANKIND?" HE IS CERTAIN THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WOULD KNOW WHAT HE HAD IN MIND. WHERE INDEED ARE OUR RELATIONS LEADING? WHETHER WE HAVE 2400 OR 2000 LAUNCHERS REALLY DOES NOT MATTER. THE IMPORTANT THING IS WHETHER WE ARE MOVING TOWARD PEACE OR TOWARD THE RUIN OF THE WHOLE PLANET. HE EXCUSED HIMSELF FOR SPEAKING SO BLUNTLY, BUT ADDED THAT THIS WAS A THOUGHT HE WISHED TO GET OFF HIS CHEST. HE THEN TURNED TO HIS PREPARED STATEMENT IN REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND READ IT TO ME PARAGRAPH BY PARAGRAPH. FOLLOWING IS A CLOSE PARAPHRASE:

2. A. FIRST, A FEW GENERAL REMARKS ON HOW SOVIET -AMERICAN RELATIONS ARE DEVELOPING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE THEM. BREZHNEV FELT OBLIGED SAY OUTRIGHT THAT THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS DOES NOT SATISFY THE SOVIETS BY A LONG SHOT. INDEED, IT CANNOT FAIL TO GIVE RISE TO CONCERN, AND THE AMERICAN LEADERS SEEM TO FEEL THIS CONCERN AS WELL. IF THAT INDEED IS THE CASE AND THERE IS A DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO
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WORK JOINTLY FOR A TURN TO THE BETTER, WHEN THERE IS NO DOUBT OF SUCCESS.

B. THE SOVIETS LEADERS HAVE DONE THEIR BEST TO PREVENT COMPLICATIONS IN OUR RELATIONS DURING THE CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATIONS, AND TO INSURE THAT CONTACTS WITH THE NEW ADMINISTRATION COULD BE MAINTAINED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST; THEY HAVE DISPLAYED AMPLE WILLINGNESS TO APPROACH PROBLEMS CONSTRUCTIVELY, RELYING ON THE GOOD BASIS WHICH WAS ACHIEVED IN PAST YEARS BY OUR JOINT EFFORTS. THIS IS SOVIET LINE, AND IT HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN A NUMBER OF PUBLIC STATEMENTS, INCLUDING BREZHNEV'S OWN SPEECHES MADE BOTH BEFORE AND AFTER PRESIDENT CARTER TOOK OFFICE.

C. UNFORTUNATELY, SOVIETS STILL DO NOT DETECT A RECIPROCAL DESIRE FROM THE UNITED STATES. THIS APPLIES FIRST AND FOREMOST TO A QUESTION OF SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE, THE CONCLUSION OF A NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF OFFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS. SPEAKING FRANKLY, THE U.S. POSITION IS RETARDING PROGRESS AND ACTING AS A BRAKE ON NEGOTIATIONS. IN PARTS IT IS ONE-SIDED AND MARKED BY PRECONCEPTIONS.

D. BREZHNEV CAN AGREE WITH THE COMMENTS IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER THAT THE MAY MEETING BETWEEN SECRETARY VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO WERE USEFUL. BUT THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR POSITIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL, AND IN THIS SENCE THE DISCUSSIONS IN GENEVA DID NOT BRING A SOLUTION OF SEVERAL MAJOR ISSUES. SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN STEPS ON THEIR PART TO MAKE PROGRESS POSSIBLE, BUT UNFORTUNATELY THE U.S. HAS NOT MADE MOVES IN REPLY. IT IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY TO FIND A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS WHICH STAND IN THE WAY OF AN AGREEMENT. BUT BEFORE THIS IS POSSIBLE - AS SECRETARY VANCE WAS TOLD IN MOSCOW AND IN GENEVA - THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IS TO BE GUIDED BY THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY. IN SUM, TO ACHIEVE A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE BALANCE OF
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INTERESTS AND NOT TO TRY TO CHANGE MATTERS TO ONE'S UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS IS IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR PEOPLES AND OF OTHER PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AS WELL. (AT THIS POINT, BREZHNEV LOOKED UP FROM HIS PREPARED TEXT AND REMARKED THAT SINCE HIS ELECTION HE HAD RECEIVED MANY LETTERS IN THIS VEIN, FROM BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND FOREIGN COUNTRIES.) UNFORTUNATELY, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT YET BEEN GIVEN REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS RENOUNCED EFFORTS TO SECURE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON SALT.

E. AS FOR ECONOMIC RELATIONS, THE U.S. IS REALLY NOT UNDERTAKING STEPS TO ELIMINATE THE DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICES WHICH IMPEDE TRADE BETWEEN US. COMMENTS MADE IN WASHINGTON RECENTLY TO FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER PATOLICHEV BY HIGH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS MAKE THIS CLEAR.

F. PREPARATIONS ARE NOT UNDERWAY FOR DISCUSSIONS THIS FALL IN BELGRADE TO PROMOTE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CSCE DECISIONS. OBJECTIVELY SPEAKING, THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT OUR COUNTRIES INTERACTING FRUITFULLY IN BELGRADE AS THEY DID EARLIER AT HELSINKI. UNFORTUNATELY THERE ARE QUITE A NUMBER OF DEVELOPMENTS WHICH STIMULATE MAJOR QUESTIONS REGARDING THE REAL POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS NO NEED TO CITE A LONG LIST OF EXAMPLES. THE WHITE HOUSE REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION IS A SERIOUS MATTER. UNDER THE PRETEXT OF DEALING WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT, THIS REPORT IS FILLED WITH SLANDEROUS ATTACKS ON SOVIET UNION AND ON ITS ALLIES; IT DISTORTS THE TRUE STATE OF AFFAIRS AND INTERFERES IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

G. MANY MAJOR PROBLEMS CAN BE SOLVED IF THE U.S. AND THE USSR WORK IN THE SAY KEY AND STRIVE FOR THE SAME
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OBJECTIVES. THIS IS IN THE INTEREST OF PEOPLES IN BOTH COUNTRIES AND THOSE ELSEWHERE. THERE IS NO NEED TO ENUMERATE THEM ALL. (AT THIS POINT BREZHNEV PAUSED TO ASK WHETHER I SMOKED; UPON BEING TOLD THAT I HAD GIVEN IT UP LONG AGO, BREZHNEV ASKED THE INTERPRETER TO LIGHT UP SO THAT HE COULD ENJOY THE SMOKE.) IT IS SUFFICIENT TO CITE THE PROBLEM OF REACHING A SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WE DETECT CERTAIN POINTS OF COINCIDENCE BETWEEN OUR POSITIONS AND THOSE OF THE U.S. ON HOW TO COOPERATE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM. WE HAVE AN UNDERSTANDING ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF CONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE TO LEAD MATTERS FORWARD TOWARD A PEACEFUL OBJECTIVE AND WE MUST WORK ACTIVELY TO CONVOKE THE CONFERENCE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL STATES IN THE REGION.

2. IF WE ACT IN THIS FASHION, WE CAN NOT ONLY HELP RESOLVE AN ACUTE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM AND HELP STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL PEACE, BUT ALSO ENRICH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AND REINFORCE CONFIDENCE IN THEIR FURTHER DEVELOPMENT. (BREZHNEV, WHO HAD BEGUN TO GESTICULATE AS IF HE WERE ON A PODIUM, INTERRUPTED HIS READING TO REMARK THAT I SHOULD NOT BE ALARMED IF HE WAVED HIS ARMS AND SHOOK HIS FIST; THIS WAS NOT INTENDED PERSONALLY, BUT IS MERELY PART OF HIS MANNER). THE CURRENT ARRHYTHMIA IN OUR RELATIONS CAN ONLY BE SOLVED THROUGH JOINT ACTION. A NEW POSITIVE SHIFT IN OUR RELATIONS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY IF THERE IS A DESIRE AND WILLINGNESS TO WORK TOGETHER. HERE ARE OBJECTIVE POSSIBILITIES FOR THIS.

I. AS FOR THE QUESTION OF BREZHNEV'S MEETING PRESIDENT CARTER, SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT IT WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATE (TSELESOOBRAZNO) TO SOLVE THE QUESTION OF A MEETING IN THE CONTEXT OF COMPLETING A NEW SALT AGREEMENT HOWEVER, HE WOULD LIKE TO DRAW ATTENTION TO ONE MATTER. THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT REGARDING THE MEETING CAN ONLY CAUSE BEWILDERMENT ON PART SOVIETS. THEY HAD TREATED THE QUESTION AS CONFIDENTIAL AT THE INSISTENT REQUEST OF THE UNITED STATES. THEN WASHINGTON SPOKE PUBLICLY ABOUT THE MATTER AND WHAT IS MORE GAVE IT A ONE-SIDED INTERPRETATION. THIS IN NO WAY IMPROVES THE ATMOSPHERE BUT IN FACT DETRACTS FROM THE VALUE OF

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CONFIDENTIAL CONTACTS.

3. HAVING COMPLETED HIS PREPARED STATEMENT, BREZHNEV SAID HE AD A LETTER IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT CARTER'S (REF B), AND REMARKED THAT HE PRESUMED THAT WE HAVE NO DESIRE TO CONCEAL THE FACT OF HIS MEETING WITH ME. I CONFIRMED THIS ASSUMPTION, AND BREZHNEV SAID THAT OF COURSE THEY WOULD SAY NOTHING IN THE

ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT THE COMMENTS HE HAD MADE TOWARD THE END OF HIS STATEMENT. HE ASKED THAT THE PROPOSED TASS STATEMENT BE READ FOR MY INFORMATION, BUT I REQUESTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS BEFORE THE PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT WAS DISCUSSED.

4. I BEGAN BY EXPRESSING MY PERSONAL GRATITUDE FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH BREZHNEV, AND TENDERED BY CONGRATULATIONS ON HIS ELECTION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM, REMARKING THAT I HOPED THE EXTRA DUTIES WOULD NOT PROVE TOO BURDENSOME. I ASSURED BREZHNEV THAT I WOULD REPORT WHAT HE HAD SAID ORALLY TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD TRANSMIT HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT PROMPTLY. I TOLD HIM THAT I FELT STRONGLY THAT MEETINGS WITH HIM AND OTHER KEY OFFICIALS ARE MOST IMPORTANT, JUST AS MEETINGS BETWEEN DOBRYNIN AND OUR TOP OFFICIALS ARE. I NOTED THAT AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN HAS SEEN THE PRESIDENT TWICE, SECRETARY VANCE MANY TIMES, AND SECRETARY BROWN AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER BREZEZINSKI ALSO. BREZHNEV COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WISHED TO RECEIVE ME EARLIER, AND THAT I SHOULD NOT RULE OUT MEETINGS WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET PRESIDUM IN THE FUTURE. I THANKED HIM AND TOLD HIM THAT I HOPED THIS WOULD APPLY TO GROMYKO AND USTINOV AS WELL.

5. RECALLING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON IN JUNE, I MENTIONED THAT I HAD MET ALL KEY MEMBERS OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND HAD A PARTICULARLY GOOD TALK WITH PRESIDENT CARTER. I ASSURED
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BREZHNEV THAT THE PRESIDENT'S DEDICATION TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE IS JUST AS DEEP AS HIS OWN, AND THAT THE PRESIDENT IS JUST AS INTERESTED IN MAKING PROGRESS TOWARD A SALT AGREEMENT AS BREZHNEV. BREZHNEV INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT NOTHING HAD COME OF THIS YET. HE NOTED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER VANCE-GROMYKO MEETING IN SEPTEMBER AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IT WOULD BRING PROGRESS. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT AS FAR AS THE EXISTING INTERIM AGREEMENT IS CONCERNED, THE SOVIETS HAVE OBSERVED IT METICULOUSLY. THEY ARE DOING NOTHING PROHIBITED BY THE AGREEMENT. BUT EVEN THOUGH THE U.S. HAS GIVEN UP PRODUCTION PLANS FOR THE B-1, "YOU WANT TO PUSH THE CRUISE MISSILE AHEAD. YOU ARE IMPELLING US TO MOVE AHEAD AS WELL. AS AN EXPERIENCED DIPLOMAT," HE CONTINUED, "YOU KNOW THAT TWO LEADERS CAN BE ACQUAINTED EVEN IF THEY DO NOT KNOW EACH OTHER PERSONALLY. POLICIES PROVIDE ACQUAINTANCE. I HAVE NOTHING AGAINST PRESIDENT CARTER. HE HAS NO GROUNDS FOR COMPLAINT."

6. PICKING UP HIS REFERENCE TO THE B-1, I POINTED OUT THAT IT HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT DECISION FOR THE PRESIDENT, WHO HAD TO MOVE IN THE FACE OF CONSIDERABLE PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO HIS DECISION. FOR THIS REASON I HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH THE

SOVIET PUBLIC REACTION AS EXPRESSED IN PRAVDA. AS FOR SALT, WE HAVE INDEED MADE SOME PROGRESS. THE LAST VANCE-GROMYKO MEETING HELPED, AND THE NEXT MEETING CAN HELP. BUT IT IS NOT HELPFUL TO CHARACTERIZE PROPOSALS OF OTHERS AS ONE-SIDED. THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO ADDRESS THE LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OF BOTH SIDES. I TOLD HIM FRANKLY THAT I WOULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT A MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT COULD MOVE THE MATTER FORWARD AND THEREFORE WAS DISAPPOINTED WITH HIS INITIAL REACTION TO THE PROPOSAL. BREZHNEV ASKED, "YOU MEAN A MEETING IN ALASKA?" AND I REPLIED, "WHEREEVER YOU WANT." BREZHNEV SAID THAT HE HAD GIVEN THE ANSWER; THE SALT DOCUMENTS MUST BE WORKED OUT. HE THEN RECALLED HIS TRIP TO THE U.S. IN 1973, AND HIS RECEPTION OF NIXON IN 1972. BOTH THESE VISITS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY PLANNED IN ADVANCE. NIXON WAS RECEIVED IN 1972 EVEN THOUGH
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HE WAS BOMBING NORTH VIET NAM AND HAD JUST MINED HAIPONG. IT WAS DIFFICULT, BUT GOOD AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED. THEY WERE WORKED OUT IN ADVANCE AND TOOK INTO ACCOUNT "THE TERRITORIAL FACTOR."

7. "LET PRESIDENT CARTER THINK ABOUT THE PROSPECTS," BREZHNEV CONTINUED. "WHAT WILL HAPPEN IF A SINGLE ATOMIC BOMB IS DROPPED?" THE RESULT WILL BE THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES - EVEN THOUGH A FEW PEOPLE MAY SURVIVE IN ISOLATED AREAS. PEOPLE LOOK TO US TO ADDRESS THIS PROBLEM. SOVIETS HAVE MADE PROPOSALS FOR NON-USE OF FORCE, FOR NON-PROLIFERATION, FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NEW WEAPONS -GROMYKO MENTIONED ALL THESE IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE - BUT NOTHING IS BEING DONE. THE SOVIET POPULATION IS NOW 258 MILLION AND WILL SOON BE 260 MILLION. YET SOVIETS HEAR STATEMENTS FROM US THAT US MUST BE THE STRONGEST POWER AND ONLY THAT CAN ASSURE PEACE. PEOPLE HERE ASK WHY US SHOULD BE STRONGER WHEN IT HAS FEWER PEOPLE, BUT THIS IS NOT THE POINT. SOVIET LEADERSHIP TRIES TO ANSWER THESE QUESTIONS PUT BY SOVIET PEOPLE, AND SOVIETS HAVE NO CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. SOVIETS HAVE GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NEVER USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AGAINST ANOTHER COUNTRY.

8. RETURNING TO THE IDEA OF A PERSONAL MEETING, I AGREED WITH BREZHNEV THAT SUCH A MEETING IS NOT VITAL TO UNDERSTAND POLICY, BUT YET IT COULD BE VERY HELPFUL. IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD CONVEY WHAT HE SAID TO THE PRESIDENT. I THEN OFFERED SOME OBSERVATIONS ON OTHER QUESTIONS BREZHNEV HAD MENTIONED.

A. TRADE: WHEN I MENTIONED THE QUESTION, BREZHNEV OBSERVED THAT IT IS AN "INTERESTING QUESTION". PEOPLE WANT TO TRADE AND THIS HAD ALWAYS BEEN THE CASE. CENTURIES
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GAO RUSSIAN MERCHANTS FROM GORKY WENT ALL THE WAY TO PERSIA. THE PROBLEM WITH TRADE WITH THE U.S. IS THAT SOME COUNTRIES HAVE MFN AND SOME DO NOT. I TOLD HIM THAT IN MY PERSONAL VIEW IT HAD BEEN A MISTAKE FOR CONGRESS TO IMPOSE A BAR TO GRANTING MFN TO THE SOVIET UNION. BUT HAVING IMPOSED IT, ONLY CONGRESS COULD REMOVE IT. MY RECENT CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY CONGRESSMEN HAVE CONVINCED ME THAT THE MODD IN CONGRESS IS NOT FAVORABLE AT THE MOMENT. WE WILL MOVE AHEAD WHEN THE ATTITUDE IN CONGRESS IS FAVORABLE.

B. HUMAN RIGHTS: I TOLD BREZHNEV THAT AS WE HAVE TRIED TO MAKE CLEAR, THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOT AIMED AT THE SOVIET UNION, IT HAS WORLD-WIDE APPLICATION AND APPLIES TO THE U.S. AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES. THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO ME AT LENGTH REGARDING HIS CONVICTIONS, AND I WAS IMPRESSED BY THE DEPTH OF HIS CONCERN. I SAID THAT I WAS CERTAIN THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD CONTINUE TO REFLECT HIS PERSONAL HUMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY IN HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS JUST AS BREZHNEV REFLECTS HIS MARXIST-LENINIST PHILOSOPHY IN HIS.

C. MIDDLE EAST: I NOTED THAT BEGIN WOULD VISIT WASHINGTON JULY 19-20 AND THAT SECRETARY VANCE WOULD VISIT THE MIDDLE EAST THEREAFTER. WE SHOULD HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE PROSPECTS FOR GENEVA AFTER THESE MEETINGS, AND WE SHALL KEEP BREZHNEV FULLY INFORMED. I THEN ADDED THAT IT IS IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION AS A RESULT OF THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT ENTIRELY PESSIMISTIC. IN PARTICULAR, IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE SOVIETS WOULD HOW RESTRAINT IN THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN ORDER NOT TO EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.

9. BREZHNEV REMARKED THAT I HAD TOUCHED ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION (ACUTALLY, HE HAD RAISED THE SUBJECT FIRST IN HIS COMMENTS ON BELGRADE), AND, REFERRING TO A PREPARED PAPER, STATED THAT HE WOULD NOT "CONCEDE" (SDAVAT'SYA)

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DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT. THE SOVIET POSITION REGARDING "ALL THE FUSS" (SHUMIKHA) IS WELL KNOWN. THE "FUSS" IS NOTHING MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT TO INTERFERE IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO SOW DISTRUST AND TO AGGRAVATE THE SITUATION AND IMPEDE SOLUTIONS.

10. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV THEN INTERVENED

(HAVING OBTAINED BREZHNEV'S PERMISSION IN ADVANCE) TO SAY THAT WHAT LEONID ILYICH (BREZHNEV) HAD SAID WAS NOT ONLY BREZHNEV'S OPINION BUT THAT OF THE ENTIRE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND OF ALL THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THE SOVIET PEOPLE CHERISH THE ASPIRATION TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO IMPROVE RELATIONS, AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS GUIDED IN ALL ITS STEPS AND PROPOSALS BY THIS ASPIRATION. REGARDING A SUMMIT MEETING, IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THAT WHEN MEETINGS OCCUR AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL WITHOUT PROPER PREPARATIONS THEY CAN EVEN HAVE A NEGATIVE EFFECT, AS MANY EXAMPLES FROM THE PAST DEMONSTRATE. IF NO AGREEMENTS ARE REACHED AT A SUMMIT, THEN WHAT CAN MINISTERS OR LOWER LEVEL OFFICIALS DO? ALL THAT SOVIETS SAY REFLECTS A WISH TO PREPARE THE MEETINGS PROPERLY, AND IS PROMPTED BY A DESIRE TO BRING MATTERS OFF DEAD CENTER AND TO IMPROVE RELATIONS. BREZHNEV PICKED UP THE POINT AND COMMENTED ON THEIR "GOOD RELATIONS" WITH FRANCE. HE NOTED - WITH SOME PROMPTING - THAT SIX AGREEMENTS WERE SIGNED DURING HIS VISIT TO FRANCE AND SAID THAT IMPORTANT TRADE DEALS WERE BEING WORKED OUT WITH THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY IN PREPARATION FOR HIS VISIT THERE. KUZNETSOV THEN CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THEY ARE NOT CLOSING THE DOOR TO A SUMMIT MEETING. BUT THEY MUST MAKE SURE THAT THE MEETING IS SUCCESSFUL AND HAS RESULTS IN ACCORD WITH THE STATURE OF OUR TWO POWERS.

11. I TOLD THEM THAT I UNDERSTOOD THEIR POSITION AND WOULD
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REPORT IT. BREZHNEV REMARKED THAT HE "LOVES CANDOR" AND WAS PLEASED TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK HIS MIND. HE HANDED ME HIS LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT AND HAD THE PROPOSED TASS STATEMENT READ. SINCE IT LEFT THE IMPRESSION THAT I HAD BEEN TREATED TO A MONOLOGUE BY BREZHNEV - PROBABLY THE ORIGINAL SOVIET INTENT - I SUGGESTED THAT A SENTENCE BE INCLUDED STATING THAT I VOICED THE VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ON THESE AND OTHER QUESTIONS THAT AROSE." HOWEVER, AFTER A BRIEF CONSULTATION WITH KUZNETSOV, BREZHNEV STATED THAT THEIRS WAS A UNILATERAL STATEMENT AND THAT I SHOULD FEEL FREE TO MAKE THIS COMMENT FROM THE EMBASSY IF I WISHED. (THE EMBASSY PRESS SPOKESMAN ISSUED THE STATEMENT WHEN TASS MOVED THE STORY).

12. THE MEETING ENDED AT 1:10 P.M. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM MATLOCK; BESIDES BREZHNEV AND KURNETSOV, AN UNIDENTIFIED SOVIET OFFICIAL WAS PRESENT AND VIKTOR SUKHODREV INTERPRETED. COMMENTS FOLLOW SEPTCL.
TOON UNQTE VANCE

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